Two Intifadas

Equal Rights for Palestinians

            The second intifada of the Palestinians resulted in poor gains and massive casualties; the next Palestinian resistance must not follow the same patterns and should gain insights from the differences between the first and second intifada. In the past, Israel has not lost international support despite successfully undercutting every Palestinian attempt to obtain rights. The Palestinian cause must gain, as Nelson Mandela described the support for his cause, “almost universal support… from virtually all political persuasions and parties” (Said, 2001, 411). In order to achieve this kind of international sympathy, Palestinians must frame their plight in the universally understood cause of achieving equal rights. This paper does not discuss the feasibility of such a movement, but merely argues the practical benefits of such an approach. As an aid to this movement, leaders should learn from the lessons of the differences between the two intifadas. In the struggle for human rights, Palestinians should utilize successful elements of the first intifada including the involvement of grass roots leadership, the successful methods of non-violent protest, and positive western media coverage.

            In the struggle for human rights, the Palestinians must adopt the pattern of the successful grass roots movement of the first intifada as opposed to the Palestinian Authority leadership of the second. The first intifada relied heavily upon, “an extensive network of local committees” (Smith, 2001, 369). This network of local leadership eventually formed, “the unified command,” referred to as the UNL (Smith, 2001, 369). Prior to the first intifada, the PLO attempted to repress local leadership to maintain their status as the sole representatives of Palestinians, but the difficulty of organizing resistance on the ground forced the PLO to cooperate with local leadership (Smith, 2001, 369). The first intifada successfully boycotted Israeli goods and businesses in the territories (Smith, 2001, 370). Women organized to support the intifada and often took jobs outside the home in order to support their families (Smith, 2001, 370). The NIHC of the second intifada attempted to play a similar on-the-ground organizational role to the UNL, but failed because the groups that made up the NIHC had “long since lost their mass support” (Hammami, 2001, 403-404). The Palestinian Authority similarly failed to “provide basic organizational and logistical support to the civilian population” (Hammami, 2001, 404). The effective methods implemented by the local leadership of the first intifada appear curiously absent from the second intifada under Arafat’s strategy of “standing back and allowing [the protests] to escalate” (Hammami, 2001, 402). Hammami argues that Arafat’s actions reflect his true aim of “maintaining the PLO as representative of all Palestinians everywhere” and that Arafat has done so by diluting the democratic process (Hammami, 2001, 403). The local leadership of the first intifada rallied the population in effective and widespread protests, which the Palestinian Authority completely failed to accomplish during the second intifada. Future successful protests must utilize local leadership in a similar manner to the first intifada in order to have success. The United States, European countries, and Palestinians have lost faith in the credibility of the Palestinian Authority because of their connection to terrorism in the past. A popular Palestinian movement seeking equal rights organized by local leadership would receive much more sympathy. In addition, the recently liberated Arab countries would identify strongly with such a movement. The Palestinians have an opportunity to utilize their experience from the first intifada of organizing under local leadership to achieve civil and human rights.

            In light of the achievements and influence gained from the non-violent protests of the first intifada, as well as the backlash of the use of violence and terrorism in both intifadas, Palestinians should unilaterally eliminate violence and separate themselves from violent protestors. The excessive response by the Israeli military to the non-violent protests of the first intifada “[stirred] public criticism within Israel” and “[caused] accusations of lying to be hurled at the military leadership and Rabin” (Smith, 2001, 370). The protests also led to international discussions including “[recognition] by many Arab and Muslim States and by the Soviet Union” (Smith, 2001, 371). Furthermore, American Jews met with Arafat and PLO officials (Smith, 2001, 371). These developments eventually led to an American recognition that the Palestinians had met the United States’ demands to enter the peace process followed by the Palestinian case coming before the UN (Smith, 2001, 372). Although these developments did not lead to the formation of a Palestinian state, they did signal the only progress made towards that goal at that time (Smith, 2001, 373). In contrast, the violent and terrorist acts leading up to the first intifada undermined the Palestinian cause in the eyes of the international community. For instance, in 1985, a Palestinian assassination squad, claiming to belong to an elite PLO group, killed three Israelis in Cyprus (Smith, 2001, 364). Just a few months later, PLO members commandeered a cruise ship and murdered a disabled American Jew (Smith, 2001, 364). These events, along with Israeli bombings of the PLO headquarters in Tunisia, led to the cancellation of peace talks with Great Britain as the arbitrator (Smith, 2001, 365). Violence during the second intifada led to increased difficulties for everyday Palestinians (Allen, 2008, 1). In response to Palestinian violence, Allen describes the establishment of checkpoints in the occupied territories moved at random,  initiation of the construction of the separation barrier built through Jerusalem, destruction of Palestinian property, and disabling of communication infrastructure (Allen, 2008, 1). According to Farsakh, since the second intifada, Israeli settlement has expanded by over 4% per year (Farsakh, 2011, 418). Notably, non-violent protests did occur during the second intifada (Hammami, 2001, 399). These events failed to bring about results, perhaps due to the majority of news coverage focusing on the violence (Hammami, 2001, 399). Non-violent protests clearly must overwhelm violent attacks in order to progress the Palestinian cause. Said asserts that the intermingling of violence with non-violent protests has prevented Palestinians from claiming the “moral high ground” and has obscured the validity of the Palestinian cause in the West (Said, 2001, 412). Hammami argues that violence and especially the involvement of Palestinian security forces “allows for greater justification for the use of Israeli military force” (Hammami, 2001, 396). In order to end Israeli occupation and achieve equality, Palestinians should return to the effective non-violent protest methods used during the first intifada. Violence has only weakened the Palestinian state infrastructure, leadership, and credibility in the international community. The Palestinians must eliminate violent outbreaks to present a united front to the world. As seen in the second intifada, intermixed violence and non-violent protests do not have nearly the same impact on achieving Palestinian objectives as the early non-violent protests of the first intifada. A popular Palestinian movement must unite under a common banner of peaceful protest in order to appeal to the hearts and minds of people around the world and gain concessions from the Israeli government.

            In a Palestinian movement for human rights, Palestinians must make use of the unprecedented news coverage from the second intifada, but with the tone of the media coverage in the first intifada. During the first intifada, the West Bank and Gaza became a topic of interest in the western media (Bishara, 2008, 8) The first intifada changed the western view of Palestinians from refugees and terrorists to “children of stones” who fought one of the most sophisticated militaries in the world with rocks (Bishara, 2008, 8). United States public opinion moved in the direction of favoring the Palestinian cause (Bishara, 2008, 8). In contrast, the second uprising largely failed to portray the Palestinian side of the conflict (Hammami, 2001, 399). As Hammami points out, the western media did have incidences of publicizing the Palestinian non-violent resistance in the second intifada, but the media often overshadowed these episodes by subsequent Palestinian acts of violence (Hammami, 2001, 399). Hammami also asserts that the Palestinian Authority did not have a strategy for influencing the western media (Hammami, 2001, 399). Said suggests that the lack of attention to the western media differentiated the Palestinian cause from the successful South African cause of ending Apartheid (Said, 2001, 412). In their appeal for human rights, the Palestinians must combine the tactics that led to western support during the first intifada with the massive media coverage of the second intifada. If executed properly, the coverage of non-violent protests requesting equal rights could lead to economic restrictions for the state of Israel until they comply with Palestinian demands. The success of this strategy relies heavily on having popular non-violent demonstrations covered by the international media. Violence against Israelis will distract the media and lose the support of the Western public. Palestinians must present a non-violent united front demanding equality to the rest of the world in order to achieve their aims.

            In conclusion, Palestinians can gain much from the sacrifices they have by renewing the grass roots leadership, the non-violent protests, and the positive media coverage of the first intifada. These elements will aid them in their bid for receiving the rights given to the rest of the citizens of Israel. A widely publicized, non-violent movement under local leadership would resonate with American and European powers as well as with the Arab world. Palestinians would exhibit their own unique brand of heroism as the poor conditions and injustices perpetrated by the Israeli government came to the attention of the public in the international community. Through leveraging the successful elements of the intifadas, Palestinians can stand up and successfully demand their human and civil rights.

Works Cited

Allen, Lori. “Getting by the Occupation: How Violence Became Normal during the Second Palestinian Intifada.” Cultural Anthropology, 23: 453–487. Jul. 2008. Web. 13 October 2011.

Bishara, Amahl. "New Media and Political Change: The Case of the Two Palestinian Intifadas." Cadmus.eui.eu. Cadmus EUI Research Repository, 4 June 2009. Web. 13 Nov. 2011. <http://hdl.handle.net/1814/11487>.

Leila Farsakh. "The One-State Solution and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Palestinian Challenges and Prospects." The Middle East Journal 65.1 (2011): 55-71. Project MUSE. Web. 13 Nov. 2011.

Hammami, Rema, and Salim Tamari. "The Second Uprising: End or New Beginning?" Journal of Palestine Studies 30.2 (2001): 5-25. Print.

Said, Edward. "The Only Alternative." Al-Ahram Weekly Online No. 523 (2001). Print.

Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2001. Print.